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With the occurrence of an armed secessionist movement on Bougain-
ville, military coups in Fiji, and the growing momentum of the Hawaiian
sovereignty movement, it is clear that issues of tradition and identity in
the Pacific can no longer be treated as the stuff of abstract and disinter-
ested anthropological scholarship. To be sure, each of these events or
movements has been about political and economic power, but like con-
flicts elsewhere in the world (eg, the Middle East, Northern Ireland, the
Balkans, and the Caucasus) they have also been rooted in contested views
of the past and in claims to separate and distinctive identities understood
to be derived from the past. In the postmodern world, tradition and iden-
tity are supplanting modernist political ideologies in the discourse of con-
flict (see Kuper 1994; Escobar 1992; Melucci 1980).
At roughly the same time as these political struggles have been taking
place in the Pacific, anthropology has been going through some upheavals
of its own. The very core of the modern discipline—fieldwork and
ethnography—has come under a new critical scrutiny (see, eg, Clifford
and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986).
These changes in the discipline of anthropology are related to changes
that have been taking place among the societies that anthropologists have
traditionally studied. Anthropology developed as an attempt to under-
stand human diversity, the dimensions of which became known to the
west through its own global expansion. Anthropology matured as a disci-
pline in the context of colonialism, and sometimes its practitioners were
more than mere beneficiaries of the colonial order (Asad 1973). In the345
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346 the contemporary pacific • fall 1997postcolonial world, villagers and urban elites alike have challenged the
right of anthropologists to represent their cultures, and the postmodern
critique within anthropology is a reaction to this restructuring in the
power relations between anthropologists and others.
If ethnographic writing is a political act, what are the implications for
anthropologists who wish to write about one of the most fundamental
bases for a people’s political action, their sense of themselves as a people?
Tradition is central to that identity, for it includes a group’s sense of their
collective past, of who they are as a people, and how they came to be who
they are.1 The discourse of tradition is a political discourse, for the con-
tent of tradition is frequently contested. It represents a symbolic resource
that can either support or undermine particular configurations of power.
Anthropologists who write about tradition enter this political arena, for
they cannot comment on the discourse of tradition without simulta-
neously adding their own voices to it.
The “Discovery” of Tradition
Tradition had been a fairly neglected topic in the social sciences for
decades until the 1980s. In that decade it became the focus of a number of
studies by historians, anthropologists, and sociologists. One contribution
that attracted considerable attention to the topic among anthropologists
working in the Pacific was a special issue of Mankind edited by Roger
Keesing and Robert Tonkinson (1982). Contributors to the volume called
attention to the malleability of tradition as a symbol. It was pointed out
that kastom (Neo-Melanesian for “custom” or “tradition”) can be evoked
to defend old ways or to promote change and can be used to support na-
tional, even pan-Melanesian unity, or to promote separatist political move-
ments (Keesing 1982, 297). The definition and evaluation of tradition
were shown to be products of a discourse structured by political rivalry
and competing ideologies (Lindstrom 1982, 317; Tonkinson 1982, 312).
Although the special issue of Mankind was a significant contribution to
Pacific anthropology, it had little impact on other fields of study or even
on anthropologists working in other areas of the world. Eric Hobsbawm
and Terence Ranger’s The Invention of Tradition (1983) had a much wider
impact. This collection of papers by historians demonstrated that in mod-
ern nation states tradition is often a conscious invention of elites who
fashion it in the service of maintaining domination. As in Keesing and
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than focusing on discourse and contestation, Hobsbawm and Ranger’s
collection emphasized conscious invention, manipulation, and hegemony.
The phrase they took as their title spread very rapidly, perhaps because it
contains a “hook.” It appears to be an oxymoron because tradition im-
plies venerable age and continuity while invention implies novelty and
deliberate fabrication (Lindstrom and White 1993).
For the rest of the decade, the most important anthropological studies
of tradition focused on the issue of invention, and some of them dealt
with contemporary Pacific Island societies (eg, Handler and Linnekin 1984;
Hanson 1989; Keesing 1989; and Linnekin 1983, but also 1990, 1991, and
1992). This literature on the invention of tradition came at a historical
moment when Pacific Islanders were determined to define their own identi-
ties, and they saw their traditions as playing an important part in this pro-
cess. Anthropologists who celebrated the role of human creativity in the
fashioning of the past in the present found their interpretations, even their
right to speak on the issue, challenged by Pacific Islanders (see, eg, Trask
1993). From the perspectives of island activists, anthropological analyses
seemed to imply, and in at least one case (Keesing 1989) directly stated,
that the traditions that Mâori, Hawaiians, and others were using as the
ideological bases for political movements were inauthentic fabrications.
Some Islanders felt they were being denied the right to define themselves.
I return to these political implications later, but for the moment wish to
recognize that the invention-of-tradition literature made a useful contri-
bution by focusing increased attention on a neglected topic, tradition, and
linking it to issues that anthropologists have become increasingly inter-
ested in—the ways in which societies reproduce themselves, the ways in
which culture and history interact to produce change, and the role of
human agency in both processes. I contend that this literature was based
on a distorted view of the nature of tradition. Analyses that place em-
phasis on processes of discourse and contestation do not escape the prob-
lem either. Ultimately, the emphasis on the malleability of tradition negates
what is ostensively affirmed in this literature—that a people’s traditions
are a product of their historically situated action. To support this claim,
in the next section I examine a number of important contributions to the
invention-of-tradition literature. This is not intended as a comprehensive
survey, but rather it focuses on a few works that raise issues central to the
construction of a more adequate understanding of tradition.
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In ordinary discourse, the term tradition is understood to refer to a set of
beliefs and practices that share (or are believed to share) some relation-
ship to the past. The beliefs are either about the nature of life in the past
or about the origins of current practices in the past (“since time immemo-
rial”). Traditional practices are those that are believed to have originated
in the past and are seen as a thread of continuity between past and
present. They may include celebrations, rituals, folktales, costume, and
other elements of expressive culture, as well as rules of conduct, items of
material culture, and techniques.
In one way or another, each of the works I consider was an attempt to
deconstruct this commonsense notion of tradition. Hobsbawm and
Ranger (1983) left it pretty much intact, but the contributors to the vol-
ume challenged the authenticity of specific traditions, and the book as a
whole sensitized other researchers to the role of invention in the produc-
tion and reproduction of traditions.
From an anthropological perspective, all tradition—indeed culture
itself—is invented, in the sense that it is a product of deliberate experi-
mentation with, and recombination of, symbolic elements present in the
repertoire of actors (Wagner 1981).2 This is a reflective process that un-
folds over time, but Hobsbawm’s distinction between authentic and in-
vented traditions hinged on the length of time involved and whether or
not the process is self-conscious (1983). That is, although invented tradi-
tions involve deliberate planning and manipulation to inculcate desired
values, Hobsbawm’s “genuine” traditions evolve over a longer period of
time without deliberate intent to indoctrinate.3
Hobsbawm hypothesized that while there are probably no times and
places in which the invention of tradition does not occur, it will be most
common in societies that are undergoing rapid transformations (1983).
Invented traditions can be seen as attempts to reverse the breakdown of
bonds of social solidarity or as attempts to produce a common identity
where none previously existed. In Hobsbawm’s terms, then, one would
expect an active process of invention in the newly independent countries
of the Pacific, particularly in Melanesia where the cultural and linguistic
diversity is extreme. The importance of the rhetoric of kastom in Mela-
nesia can be viewed in this light (see, eg, Keesing 1982; Tonkinson 1982;
Lindstrom and White 1993).
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rampant, not only in Melanesia, but throughout the contemporary Pacific,
including Australia, New Zealand, and Hawai‘i (1989; see also Babadzan
1988). Keesing claimed that the pasts that Islanders are actively creating
today often bear little resemblance to the lifeways of their ancestors as
documented historically, ethnographically, and archaeologically. Invented
traditions portray Pacific cultures, or selected elements of them, as oppo-
site to negatively valued aspects of western culture, and according to
Keesing the strength and appeal of those created pasts are related to this
rejection of the devalued elements (cf, Thomas 1992a). This rejection of
western culture is selective, and so, for example, the compatibility of cus-
tom and Christianity may be stressed in nationalistic rhetoric (see, eg,
Tonkinson 1982).
The contrast that Keesing drew between authentic and inauthentic ver-
sions of the past, like Hobsbawm’s (1983) distinction between genuine
and invented traditions, assumed the existence of an objective and recov-
erable past. But lurking beneath the surface was another distinction—that
between culture as a way of life and culture, kastom, or tradition as a
substantivized representation of that way of life (see also Keesing 1982).
Keesing objected to the disparity he saw between culture as it is (or was)
lived and the way it was portrayed in concepts of kastom or tradition as
symbols of identity. He saw anthropologists as (uniquely?) qualified to
speak about the realities of cultures as lived and considered it their duty
to spell out when past lifeways are portrayed inaccurately in nationalist
rhetoric (1993, 587).
Though the terminology Allan Hanson employed was similar to that of
Keesing, his article on the invention of Mâori culture drew on a different
scholarly tradition (1989). Whereas Keesing’s piece was a Marxist cri-
tique of false consciousness (1989), Hanson eschewed the objectivist dis-
tinction between authentic and inauthentic traditions, maintaining that
all traditions are inventions that draw on an interpreted past to meet the
needs of the present. It is possible to distinguish, then, between a weaker
approach to the deconstruction of tradition that differentiates between
genuine and invented tradition, and a more radical approach that dis-
solves the distinction. (The latter more radical form of deconstruction has
become dominant in the invention-of-tradition literature, at least in anth-
ropology; my future references to that literature will be to the stronger
form of critique.) Not surprisingly, peoples whose traditions have been
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call into question claims to the continuity of tradition.
In his article, Hanson traced the development of two elements of
Mâori tradition, the claim that New Zealand had been settled by the
occupants of a Great Fleet, and the belief in the existence of a precontact
cult of a supreme being named Io (1989). He claimed that anthropolo-
gists, working within the paradigm of diffusionist anthropology and moti-
vated by the goal of merging European and Mâori to form a single nation,
laid down the foundations of both elements of tradition. Motivated by a
different political agenda, Mâori later drew on these constructed tradi-
tions to forge a common Mâori identity and to differentiate themselves
from European New Zealanders.
In discussing the Mâori material, Hanson took as his starting point the
observation that culture and tradition are not stable things handed down
intact from one generation to the next, but are the products of an ongoing
process of invention or fabrication. In discussing the fluidity of tradition
Hanson invoked Jacques Derrida and claimed that to speak of a histori-
cally fixed tradition (the commonsense notion of tradition) is to engage in
what Derrida called “the metaphysics of presence” and “logocentrism.”
Rather than seeing the interpretations of nineteenth-century anthropolo-
gists and contemporary Mâori as distortions of an essential core, Hanson
suggested that Mâori culture be viewed as having always been “a sort of
nonlocus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into
play” (Derrida 1978, 280, quoted in Hanson 1989, 898).
Because traditions are always invented and fluid, according to Hanson,
the anthropologist’s analytic task is not to strip away the inauthentic por-
tions to expose an authentic core, but to understand the process by which
invented traditions come to be accepted as authentic. Hanson saw this
process of authentication as a simple matter of social reproduction. Just
as any social behavior is reproduced in the context of everyday inter-
action, so are “invented traditions” reproduced and, in the process,
authenticated.
Hanson pointed out that while this encompassment of invention in
ordinary social reproduction demystifies the process, it fails to distinguish
it, and, after all, he claimed, there is a need to recognize that something is
distinctive about the process of invention. He proposed that the term
invention be limited to sign substitutions that are considerably different
from those on which they are modeled, that are selective, and that sys-
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the last of these three characteristics, who determines that a particular
instance of social reproduction is not only innovative but also systemati-
cally political in intent?
Very often . . . the inventive quality of sign-substitutions is only recognizable
from the outside and when they form clusters. Percy Smith, Edward Tregear
and Elsdon Best [New Zealand anthropologists who played a role in crystal-
lizing Mâori tradition] worked ingenuously within the tradition of diffusionist
anthropology. . . . Certainly they did not consider these theories to be inven-
tions. The same may be said of contemporary advocates of Maoritanga. But
when detached observers consider these two movements as wholes, and com-
pare the images of Maori culture they advocate and the political agendas they
espouse, their status as inventions becomes obvious. (Hanson 1989, 899)
The question is, who are these detached observers, and is such detach-
ment possible? It would appear, after all, that Hanson’s position is not so
very different from Keesing’s in at least one respect: disinterested anthro-
pologists can spot invention while cultural insiders might not. But just
when it seemed that Hanson had retreated to an objectivist position, he
pointed out that his own essay was itself simply an exercise in sign substi-
tution, no more privileged in its truth claims than any other. (Barber has
argued that this postmodernist denial of truth claims can also be seen as a
denial of responsibility for what is written [1990].)
Hanson finished off his essay by raising the question of whether the
essay itself could be seen as an invention. He concluded that it could not
but that the invention-of-tradition literature, taken as a whole, is an in-
vention insofar as it does depart significantly from previous anthropolog-
ical thinking on the nature of tradition. There is an issue here that Han-
son did not consider. As a cultural invention, the invention-of-tradition
literature must “systematically manifest the intention to further some
political or other agenda” (Hanson 1989, 899). What political agenda
motivates the invention-of-tradition literature? None is acknowledged,
with the effect that its writers appear to be debunking the political
ideology of the Hawaiian sovereignty movement (Linnekin 1983; Han-
dler and Linnekin 1984), Quebec nationalism (Handler 1983, 1984,
1985), or efforts toward Mâori self-determination (Hanson 1989) from
some privileged and dispassionate vantage point, even though individual
authors might stress that this is not what they intend. However, cultural
352 the contemporary pacific • fall 1997insiders do see a political agenda in this literature (see, eg, Trask 1991,
1993).
Hanson’s depiction of Mâori culture as a “non-locus” and a process of
“sign substitutions” provoked a great deal of controversy in New
Zealand, not only among Mâori activists but also among academics, both
European and Mâori. (See Webster 1993 for a good discussion of the reac-
tion of New Zealand academics.) It is not difficult to see why the article
would have provoked such a strong reaction. First, it gives insufficient
attention to precontact elements in the two themes of Mâori tradition
that Hanson discussed. Thus, although he argued that the Great Fleet tra-
dition is the product of European efforts to systemize, compile, and inter-
pret diverse Mâori sources, he paid little attention to the fact that the
sources being interpreted were Mâori.
Second, when viewed from the perspective of many New Zealanders,
Hanson’s scholarly attempt to deconstruct the notion of an essential
Mâori tradition was politically insensitive. He argued that the semiotic
process of sign substitution was not random. Those anthropologists whose
work crystallized the traditions in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies had particular motives, as do modern proponents of Mâoritanga
(Mâoriness). Recognizing that the construction of tradition occurs within
a political force field, Hanson was also aware that Mâori have not
exerted equal power in New Zealand political life for a long time. To say
that Mâori tradition as defined by Mâori themselves is simply an exercise
in sign substitution, an arbitrary assigning of meaning no more nor less
authentic than any other, was predictably seen as denying them the power
to define who and what they are or were. Third, in an article about the
invention of Mâori culture, one might expect some discussion about the
culturally specific geist that governs its invention or construction. When a
people interpret their past, their interpretations do not simply reflect the
political expediency of the moment; they also reflect cultural structures of
long duration. There is no discussion in the Hanson article of this kind of
continuity through time; theoretically speaking, this is the article’s great-
est deficiency. I argue later that this lacuna is common in the invention-
of-tradition literature. In Hanson’s case this is especially problematic
because elsewhere he has provided a good discussion of the kinds of
structures I mean (see Hanson and Hanson 1983, especially pages 190–
194). He did not integrate those insights into the essay being discussed
here, however.
One last point arises from to the Hanson article. Levine pointed out
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more properly be termed the construction of political ideology (1991).
More precisely, Hanson elided the distinction between “culture as lived”
and tradition. Tradition includes the aspect of political ideology that
draws on an interpreted past as a symbolic resource. This confusion of
culture as a system of symbols with culture as symbol (of identity) en-
abled Hanson to extend the role of anthropologists from that of inter-
preters of Mâori culture to creators of it. But as Webster pointed out, it is
only the representations of a culture that can be created, appropriated, or
exploited by outsiders (1993, 238). “Culture as lived” necessarily remains
in the hands of those whose culture it is.
Jolly has rejected this distinction between culture as lived and tradition,
on the grounds that the presumed unself-consciousness of culture as lived
is too easily equated with authenticity, and the self-conscious construction
of tradition with inauthenticity (1992a; see also Lindstrom and White
1993). These equations clearly lie behind Hobsbawm’s distinction between
genuine and invented traditions, for example (1983; see also Handler and
Linnekin 1984, 280). But the notion that culture as lived is unself-
conscious and unreflective is untenable. After all, the phrase implies a set
of concepts, strategies, skills, and so on that one needs in order to get on
in a socially constructed world, and this process of “getting on” always
requires some reflection. But tradition involves the substantivization of
certain aspects of a way of life that then become symbols of group iden-
tity (see Thomas 1992a; 1992b). Since the forging of tradition is a process
of self-identity, what matters most in social analysis is not whether the
past was really the way a people claim it was, so much as those aspects of
their past and present that limit, structure, and explain their portrayal of
the past. Lindstrom referred to tradition as an attempt “to read the
present in terms of the past by writing the past in terms of the present”
(1982, 317). The context in which that reading and writing take place
deserves attention.
Jocelyn Linnekin has perhaps written more extensively on these pro-
cesses of identity construction and invention of tradition than any other
anthropologist working in the Pacific. Her work furthers the understand-
ing of tradition in important ways, but, like Hanson (1989), in her theo-
retical discussions of the invention of tradition she failed to pay sufficient
attention to cultural structures of long duration that inform tradition and
make it intelligible.
Linnekin’s writings on the topic of tradition span almost a decade, long
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liest paper on the topic (1983), her position was arguably closer to that of
Hobsbawm (1983) than to that of Hanson (1989). In it she stated that
“For Hawaii ‘traditional’ properly refers to the precontact era, before
Cook’s arrival in 1778” (1983, 242). This implies that any values, beliefs,
or practices that have become part of Hawaiian culture since that time are
not genuinely traditional. In her most recent article on the subject,
however, she positioned the invention-of-tradition literature within the
postmodern project of decentering anthropological discourse. Questions
of authenticity are ultimately unanswerable because “all cultural repre-
sentations—even scholarly ones—are contingent and embedded in a par-
ticular social and political context” (Linnekin 1992, 250).
Despite the differing perspectives that isolated snippets of text seem to
imply, however, Linnekin’s views on the nature of tradition have been
fairly consistent on some key points:
1 Tradition is fluid because it always reflects the needs of an ever-changing
present.
2 Tradition is not a “thing” or set of “things.” To treat it as if it were
implies that there is some essential, definable core when, in fact, tradition is
always shifting. Further, to treat tradition as if it were a thing is to naturalize
and objectify a concept.
3 Rather than being a definable collection of things, tradition is a process
through which the past and aspects of social life said to be derived from the
past are valorized in the present.
4 Tradition, as a process of interpretation that draws on the past to define
an identity in the present, is distinct from culture, though the process of inven-
tion is central to both.
5 Insofar as tradition is always changing, the distinction between genuine
and inauthentic traditions is spurious.
I agree with each of these points, and Linnekin and others who have
developed these issues have furthered our understanding of the nature of
tradition. The problem with Linnekin’s work lies not in the various theo-
retical points she has made, but in the way she has applied this theoretical
framework in analyzing Hawaiian tradition. There is a certain dissonance
between her articles on the invention of tradition and her ethnographic
writing. First, the theoretical insights that she developed elsewhere (Han-
dler and Linnekin 1984) were not fully integrated into her ethnography,
Children of the Land (1985). There she wrote of Ke‘anae, a Hawaiian
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lifestyle as can be found in the islands” (1985, 22). She noted that it rep-
resents “a more authentic tradition than the somewhat eclectic version
promoted by Hawaiian nationalism” (1985, 2), although “the pursuit of
a real Hawaiian tradition is difficult in this context, where authenticity
seems so easily invented” (1985, 239). In these and other passages Lin-
nekin’s usage implies that tradition entails an essential, enduring core of
culture traits, quite different from that summarized here. Second, the im-
portant continuities that she did demonstrate in Children of the Land are
not emphasized in her more theoretical discussions of Hawaiian tradition.
The consequence of this disjunction between her theoretical and ethno-
graphic writing is that an important characteristic of tradition is inade-
quately explored.
That important characteristic is continuity in the interpretive frame-
work through which a people understand and evaluate human action. For
example, the residents of Ke‘anae make a spatial distinction between
“inside” and “outside.” This distinction draws on a number of different
contrasts: rural versus city life, Hawaiian versus “foreign” spheres of
interaction, east (the direction of the Hawaiian community of Hâna fur-
ther “inside”) versus west (the direction of the town of Kahului “out-
side”), and wet versus dry. But the distinction also connotes contrasting
systems of social relations—the hierarchic, market-oriented relations of
the “outside” world and the egalitarian, generalized exchange that ought
to obtain “inside.” Surely there are continuities here with contrasting
spheres of exchange in precontact society—hierarchy confirming flows of
tribute, on the one hand, and solidarity enhancing reciprocity on the other.
This emphasis on intracommunal generalized reciprocity is associated
with a ranking of the items that get exchanged, and Linnekin noted that
here, too, there has been continuity. For example, the most highly valued
foods exchanged at modern luau are the same foods that were formerly
presented to the gods (Linnekin 1985, 115). Linnekin also pointed out
that the structural emphasis on ties traced through women, a characteris-
tic of contemporary Hawaiian kinship, may also have a basis in precon-
tact society (1985, 104–105). Thus, the ways in which social relation-
ships are both traced and expressed exhibit continuities. Moreover, these
ways of expressing relatedness through exchange are not only understood
to be rooted in the past, but also defined as characteristically Hawaiian.
In a word, they are traditional.
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plored in Children of the Land would have been central to her more theo-
retical discussions of Hawaiian tradition. Certainly one can find in these
articles statements acknowledging that the process of interpreting the past
reflects continuity. She noted, for example, that by emphasizing that tra-
dition is symbolically constructed in the present, she did “not mean to
suggest a cultural tabula rasa for every generation” (1990, 161). She ac-
knowledged that to many non-anthropologists the word “ ‘invention’
suggests de novo creation and hence inauthenticity” (1992, 252), though
this is not what either she or Hanson (1989) meant by the term. One
looks in vain for a sustained development of these statements in her more
theoretical discussions of Hawaiian tradition and identity. There, the em-
phasis is on invention as a process of discontinuity; that is, the aspect of
invented traditions that is stressed is the way in which they represent de-
partures from what came before.4 This emphasis is general throughout
the literature on the invention of tradition. Indeed, as Hanson pointed
out, the use of the term invention is a deliberately provocative rhetor-
ical move meant to imply novelty and deliberate fabrication (1989, 450).
Having invested in that rhetorical move, Hanson and Linnekin paid
insufficient attention to the continuities of interpretive structure that they
themselves explored in other publications (Hanson and Hanson 1983;
Linnekin 1985). The result is a distorted and inadequate view of the
nature of tradition. The most serious problem here is not lack of sensitiv-
ity to efforts of national or ethnic self-definition, but that through inade-
quate attention to the continuities that guide these processes they will be
misunderstood.
Continuity and Constraint
The invention-of-tradition literature has produced some valuable insights,
but I would argue that in order to correctly portray the process of inven-
tion (I would prefer the word interpretation), one must acknowledge con-
tinuity and constraint as aspects of tradition. These ideas are not totally
absent from the invention-of-tradition literature (see, eg, Linnekin 1990,
1992), but they have definitely been suppressed in favor of an emphasis
on the “free play of sign substitution,” novelty, and discontinuity.
In this respect the invention-of-tradition literature could be seen, I sup-
pose, as presenting a liberating view of the human condition. In a sense it
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of individualism, in which individuals, as something isolable from the
social whole and from any particular roles or relationships, are seen as
free to recreate and redefine themselves. What contributors to the inven-
tion-of-tradition literature have chosen not to emphasize is that societies,
like persons, are embedded in determinate pasts that limit and explain the
process of self-identity.
The process by which a people interpret their collective past (ie, the
formulation of tradition) is constrained by the past in two senses. First, a
people live in a historically constructed world that exists independently of
them and their interpretations. The physical aspects of that world, the
various societies that coexist in it, and the positioning of those societies
relative to one another are all historical products. No society freely chooses
its own history, nor is it free to choose its own position in the world (cen-
tral or peripheral, powerful or relatively powerless) (Webster 1993; Fried-
man 1992b). But these facts about a society’s position in the world can
determine whether or not its members are free to define themselves for
others, project their own interpretations of their history, and maintain
their own traditions. Cultural or political movements such as the Hawai-
ian renaissance and Mâori self-determination are attempts to reclaim the
power of self-definition. The specific content of the traditions asserted by
such movements can only be understood in the context of particular his-
tories. One of most frequent criticisms of the invention-of-tradition litera-
ture is that it has not paid sufficient attention to this fact. The traditions
projected by nationalistic movements are often portrayed as strategic
maneuvering on the part of political elites motivated by considerations of
the present. Inadequate attention is paid to the historical processes that
produced the particular political fields within which elites must operate
(compare, eg, Handler 1984 and Arcand 1984 on Quebec nationalism).
Whether the emphasis is on the self-interested positioning of political
elites (Keesing 1989) or “the decentered play of sign substitutions” (Han-
son 1989), the literature on the invention of tradition has not only under-
played the constraining force of history, but it often glosses over the
network of social relations and institutions within which tradition and
identity are constructed and asserted. As Norton has recently argued,
many of the recent discussions of tradition in the Pacific (including some
that do not focus on the process of invention) “privilege the logics of dis-
course in ways that tend to obscure the manner in which discourse oper-
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742). To a great extent this literature reflects the project of an Ameri-
can-style cultural anthropology (cf, Kuper 1994). The goal is to explicate
the culturally specific systems of symbols used in the discourse on tradi-
tion. Although there may also be an attempt to understand the strategic
deployment of symbols, the field of social relations within which this dis-
course takes place often remains a shadowy stage.
Norton pointed out that the effect of this situation is to blur important
differences that exist among Pacific Island societies. The social fields
within which the discourse on tradition is transacted are very different in
Hawai‘i and Fiji, for example. In Fiji there is a congruence between the
discourse on tradition and “routine social experience” (Norton 1993,
745). In contrast, in Hawai‘i and New Zealand cultural identity has to be
constructed and asserted in opposition to the routine social experience of
life in societies dominated by other ethnic groups.
To be sure opposition also plays a role in the politics of tradition in Fiji.
It can be argued, as Thomas (1992a) has, for example, that contemporary
Fijian culture differs (necessarily?) from its precontact antecedents in the
degree to which it is defined in opposition to the values, customs, and
patterned behavior of other ethnic groups. To this Norton might respond
that while opposition is important in the discourse on culture and tradi-
tion in Fiji, Fijian identities are nonetheless constructed in the context of
social action in a field of structured social relations. The routines of
everyday life continually assert and reproduce a distinct Fijian identity
and, consequently, oppositional discourse does not have the same signifi-
cance as it does in Hawai‘i or New Zealand.
Norton has rendered a service with the reminder that tradition and iden-
tity are constructed, asserted, and discussed in the context of ongoing
social relations; that these systems of social relations vary significantly
throughout the Pacific; and that local discourses on identity and tradition
can only be understood in terms of these differences (1993). But although
his call to refocus attention on social relations and the routines of every-
day life is salutary, in my opinion he placed too great a stress on social
structure as the field in which those routines are lived. This led him to over-
emphasize the differences in the ways Mâori and Fijian identities are con-
structed, but to make that point, I must return to a claim I made earlier.
I stated that a people’s interpretation of their past in the present (a pro-
cess that generates tradition) is constrained by the past in two senses. The
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find themselves. That world is a product of historical processes that un-
folded independently of a people’s present-day interpretations of them,
and the configuration of that world either limits or empowers their efforts
to define themselves and their past for others.
The second constraint derives not from the determinate nature of a
people’s past, but from their own prior interpretations. What is at issue
here is not the specific content of those interpretations, but the cultural
logic that informs them. Much of the recent literature on tradition ignores
how the inventive or discursive process is guided by deep and relatively
enduring structures of thought, feeling, and action. When a people selec-
tively fashion their vision of the past, they do so in terms of cultural cate-
gories (Sahlins 1985), culturally specific logics (eg, the recursive dualism
characteristic of the cultures of some Austronesian-speaking peoples;
Mosko 1985), culturally specific models of personhood that inform
understanding of motivation and agency (see, eg, Levy 1973; White and
Kirkpatrick 1985), and culturally standardized scenarios (ie, models of
and for social action or process; see, eg, Schieffelin 1976; Turner 1986).
They cannot do otherwise and still construct (for themselves) meaningful
interpretations of human action in the past or the present, any more than
they can form meaningful utterances without instantiating the grammati-
cal categories of their language.
To say that these underlying structures of thought, feeling, and action
are relatively enduring is to imply that they do change, just as the gram-
mar of a language changes. They can change as a consequence of their
own internal logics or in response to catastrophic events and culture con-
tact. Individuals, whose cognitions and actions instantiate these struc-
tures, are agents of both continuity and change. Each person both “main-
tains the continuity of meanings and transforms them by virtue of actively
constituting an understanding of the world in and through relations with
others” (Toren 1994, 979).
To say that this process of interpreting the past is structured is to recog-
nize that a person’s actions in the present (including the act of interpreta-
tion) are dependent on a determinate past. That past, independently of
current interpretations of it, produced the cognitive, emotive, and habit-
ual structures that make each person what they are. Thus, each person is
a product as well as an agent of history; indeed, their agency is a histori-
cal product.
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continuities of the long term. (On the concept of “structuring structures”
or “structuration” see Giddens 1979, 1984; Bourdieu 1977.) The struc-
tures that guide the interpretation of the past or “invention of tradition”
are laid down through the routines of everyday life. The issue I take with
Norton (1993) is that those routines are linked to, but not fully contained
by, social structure. A society may undergo massive structural transfor-
mations, yet some areas of daily routine and some collective habits of
thought, feeling, and action may be left intact. A people’s ongoing inter-
pretations of their past and definition of their collective identity reflect or
resonate with these continuities, as much for Mâori and Hawaiians as for
Fijians. While the identities of submerged peoples may be forged and pro-
jected through oppositional discourse, that oppositional discourse can also
be a product of a historically rooted and distinctive identity experienced
in a political field dominated or contested by others.
The continuity and constraint that I see as important characteristics of
tradition are, in part, consequences of the fact that tradition is enacted or
embodied. Through their bodies human beings experience and act on the
world (Farnell 1994). Those experiences and actions of their personal and
collective pasts leave their marks on their bodies in the form of character-
istic motor patterns and postures—what Connerton (1989) called habit
memory—as well as characteristic modulations of the senses. But the cen-
trality of the body goes deeper. As noted earlier, a people’s interpretation
of their past and their claims to identity in the present necessarily reflect
structuring structures of thought, feeling, and behavior, and those pat-
terns of cognition and emotion as well as of action are all centered in the
human body. If the study of tradition is narrowed to a consideration of
the discourse on tradition, there is a risk of misunderstanding it in a fun-
damental way.
Invention has been supplanted by an emphasis on discourse in much of
the recent literature on tradition and identity in the Pacific. This literature
focuses on an important aspect of the processes through which particular
traditions are constructed, projected, and contested in localized contexts.
Often it is not the act of speaking that is the principal object of analysis,
however, but the product of the act (and interaction), the text. But tradi-
tion itself (as opposed to what anthropologists write about what other
people write or say about their traditions) is not a disembodied text; it is
embodied action. In the next section, I examine the issue of continuity in
the context of embodied tradition in contemporary Fiji.
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The invention-of-tradition literature is an attempt to reinterpret the link
between social formations understood to be derived from the past and
social action in the present. Rather than viewing tradition as a passively
accepted legacy, the literature sees it as an active interpretive process in
which representations of the past are forged through conflict and dis-
course in the present. I have argued that contributors to this rethinking
of tradition have paid too little attention to issues of continuity and
constraint.
Contemporary Fiji is an especially appropriate case for examining
these questions, in part because the issue of invented traditions has been
raised in the aftermath of the military coups of 1987 and the subsequent
constitutional changes in Fiji. The coups themselves were part of a more
general process of ferment centered on issues of ethnicity and tradition
that had been simmering since the colonial era.
British colonial policy emphasized ethnic distinctions in such areas of
public life as administration, education, and political representation.
Structural conflicts developed between the interests of Indo-Fijians and
Fijians, a process abetted by European business interests and the colonial
administration. The resultant Fijian and Indo-Fijian ethnic blocs are inter-
nally diverse, however, and historically their unity has largely been a
product of their mutual confrontation. There has always been the poten-
tial for building alliances across the ethnic divide on the basis of shared
regional and class interests. The Coalition Party that successfully con-
tested the 1987 national election had forged such an alliance.
The Coalition offered a new formulation of the roles of ethnicity and
Fijian tradition in national political life. Under Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara’s
leadership, the Alliance Party that governed Fiji throughout its first seven-
teen years of independence projected a consociational model of nation-
hood. (On the concept of consociational nationhood see, eg, Lijphart
1977.) The rights and interests of all ethnic groups would be respected as
the country as a whole progressed along a path of controlled develop-
ment. Fiji was promoted as “the way the world ought to be,” a model of
interethnic cooperation and tolerance. This vision assumed, however, that
national development would proceed under an ethnic Fijian leadership in
which chiefly hierarchy and tradition played important roles.
During the campaign leading up to the 1987 election, Dr Timoci Bava-
dra, the leader of the Coalition, argued for the separation of Fijian chiefly
362 the contemporary pacific • fall 1997tradition and modern electoral politics and called for the abandonment of
the politics of ethnicity in favor of a recognition of the common interests
of all Fiji’s citizens. Pursuant to the latter his party also proposed a re-
organization of the Native Lands Trust Board, the agency that adminis-
ters the leasing of Fijian-owned land and whose policies are of vital con-
cern to both Indo-Fijian tenants and Fijian owners. The leader of the
coups, then-Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, attempted to justify his action, in
part, in terms of the supposed threat to Fijian land rights that this reorga-
nization would pose (Dean and Ritova 1988).
To be sure, concrete issues of political and economic power lay behind
the coups, but these events must also be seen as the outcome of a highly
charged confrontation between alternative visions of nationhood, ethnic-
ity, and tradition. In this context the deconstruction of tradition has in-
escapable political significance. Raising what Margaret Jolly called the
specter of inauthenticity (1992a), Fijian, Indo-Fijian, and foreign critics of
the coups have pointed out that such central features of contemporary
Fijian traditionalism as the system of land tenure and the Great Council
of Chiefs are really constructions of British colonialism.
This charge, that institutions that many Fijians consider central to a
distinctly Fijian way of life are really colonial legacies, is not new. In a
carefully researched book, Peter France showed how the British, under
the initial leadership of Sir Arthur Gordon, constructed the legal system
of Fijian land tenure (1969). Rather than attempting to devise a new
tenurial system designed to meet Fijians’ contemporary needs, Gordon
sought to base the system on what he thought were ancient principles of
communal ownership. A series of Native Lands Commissions were charged
with the task of investigating these “ancient principles” and codifying
them into law. France showed how the commission’s model of customary
Fijian tenure reflected the assumptions of the social evolutionary theory
current in nineteenth-century anthropology. His deconstruction of this
colonial invention anticipated Hobsbawm and Ranger’s book (1983) by
more than a decade.
Given France’s pioneering work and the subsequent impact of Hobs-
bawm and Ranger (1983), it is not surprising that the concept of invented
tradition has been used in recent anthropological writing on Fiji (see, eg,
Rutz 1987; Kaplan 1989, 1990). The problem with the term invented tra-
dition, however, is that the implication of inauthenticity seems unavoid-
able, whether intended by the author or not, and in the context of con-
turner • reconstructing the concept of tradition 363tested views of the past the label of “inauthenticity” has political implica-
tions that must be acknowledged. Moreover Hobsbawm’s distinction be-
tween genuine and invented traditions (1983) ignored the fact that beliefs
and practices are “traditional” when they inform the consciousness and
behavior of actors. At that point the distinction between “genuine” and
“invented” traditions may not be relevant to the actors themselves. What-
ever the origins of the belief, practice, or institution, it has become their
tradition (cf, Thomas 1992a, 71). Because it is theirs, they will continue
to contemplate, evaluate, and reinterpret it as long as it remains relevant
to their lives in the present and to their vision of the future. Fijians today
are intensely involved in these processes, and they do not all agree. Study-
ing this social ferment demands clarity about what is involved in repro-
ducing or rejecting tradition.
Fijians themselves have some important insights into these processes.
They acknowledge that custom and tradition have altered over time as
certain values, practices, and beliefs have been deleted and others added.
Tradition is defined as appropriate action rather than being viewed as a
set of static prototypes derived from the past. That is, whether under-
stood to be endogenous or exogenous in origin, and whether the product
of an unself-conscious evolution or a deliberate fabrication, beliefs and
practices come to be accepted as traditional if they conform to certain
very general cultural principles that are assumed to have obtained in the
past as they do in the present. Given this understanding of tradition,
Fijians are able to conceptually bridge the disjunction between the
pre-Christian past of their ancestors and the postcolonial present.
Jolly has contrasted this Fijian perception of continuity with the ni-
Vanuatu sense that colonialism represents a rupture in their history
(1992b). The ni-Vanuatu have attempted to reassert control over their
own history and identity through a self-conscious revival of kastom on
both the national and local levels. Other Melanesian examples could be
adduced for both the Fijian and ni-Vanuatu reactions. Jolly saw the expla-
nation for these differing perceptions of history in differences of colonial
policy in the two island groups. In Fiji, she noted, the colonial administra-
tion valorized custom, at least those aspects of it that did not promote
“disorder” and hence threaten British control (Kaplan 1989). According
to Jolly, of equal, if not greater importance, is that the preservation of
Fijian land rights was made the cornerstone of colonial policy in the early
period, and later attempts to make the sale of native lands easier were
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there was an uneasy balance between French and British interests. The
alienation of native lands was much more extensive than in Fiji, and in
that, Jolly suggested, lay the root cause of the ni-Vanuatu sense of loss
and rupture in their history. Moreover, in Vanuatu there was no positive
valuation of native custom on the part of colonial administrators; at best
there was tolerance.
It would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of the preserva-
tion of Fijian control of land as a factor in the colonial and postcolonial
history of Fiji. But though British colonial policy toward Fijians had a
benign aspect, government control was extended by force in some areas,
and the colonial administration could be meddlesome, arrogant, and
repressive when its control appeared to be threatened. It leveled taxes and
made demands on Fijians’ time and labor, and (something remembered by
older Fijians) colonial society operated with a color bar. There would be
ample justification for Fijians to view it as a disruptive intrusion that
denied them control over their own history.
I noted earlier that daily routine plays an important role in the sedi-
mentation of the structuring structures of thought, feeling, and action
that generate the reproduction of culture. These “structuring structures”
play a central role in the interpretation of human motivation and action
and are the basis of an understanding of the past as well as the present. It
is highly significant, then, that in Fiji and elsewhere much of the repres-
siveness of colonial regimes focused on daily routines and the body.
In Fiji the imposition of new forms of bodily control and “shaping”
predated colonialism. At the time of contact, Fijian men wore their hair
long and invested considerable time, care, and ingenuity in dressing it
(Williams 1982). This can be seen as a local expression of a common
Oceanic view of the head as the center of mana. Male dress consisted of a
barkcloth loincloth (malo). Women wore short, fringed skirts (liku), and
both tattooing and scarification were used to beautify women’s bodies
(Williams 1982).
Christian missionaries insisted that their converts cut their long hair
and that men and women alike replace traditional garments with cotton
waist-cloths (sulu). Fijian bodies thus transformed not only bore the marks
of religious conversion, but also expressed political alignment. Through
his own conversion, Cakobau, the head of the Bauan confederacy and
self-styled King of Viti, had made Christianity the official religion of the
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remained beyond his control showed their resistance to his church and
state through their unshorn locks and unclothed bodies. Groups who
rebelled against Bauan hegemony “threw off the cloth” and resumed tra-
ditional attire (Brewster 1922).
The colonial regime that replaced Cakobau’s government extended its
sphere of control to include not only the bodies of Fijians but also the cul-
turally constructed spaces they inhabited. Through a series of regulations
and ordinances, the government sought to control such matters as how
houses should be constructed and furnished, what activities could be car-
ried out in them, how the space of the village was to be maintained, and
so on. Ostensibly these regulations were designed to improve sanitation
and public health and were motivated by concern over Fijian population
decline. Similar concerns lay behind regulations that related specifically to
women and their activities.
Thomas pointed out that these sanitation regulations reflected British
notions of orderliness, which placed a high value on openness, clearly
defined boundaries, and a particular way of ordering activities in spatial
terms. He referred to the regulations as a symbolic labor, claiming that
the prohibition of specific practices mattered less than the demonstration
that the state had the power to regulate (1990, 167). I would argue, how-
ever, that more concrete issues of power and control were at stake here,
regardless of whether they were apparent to colonial administrators or
Fijian villagers. To control a subject population most effectively, the state
cannot rely solely on external constraint; it must “invade” the bodies of
its subjects. If a colonized people are to replicate the imposed power
structure in their everyday actions, their movements, postures, and bodily
habits must be remolded in appropriate ways. Such reordering of the
body will be most effective if the cultural space through which bodies
move is ordered in compatible ways. So, for example, regulations dealing
with the ordering and use of domestic space were linked to European
notions about appropriate gender relations and the importance of the
nuclear family; they defined new spatial parameters within which Fijians
would live their intimate lives. Similarly the consolidation of settlements
and the relocation of population to more accessible sites not only facili-
tated routine administration, but also deconstructed the settlement pat-
tern associated with warfare.
Issues relating to the reordering of the Fijian body (and body politic) by
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istic protest following the election of the Coalition government in 1987.
The main vehicle for this protest was the Taukei Movement.5 While sup-
porters of the Bavadra government regarded the movement as the product
of a conspiracy among defeated Alliance politicians, its supporters main-
tained that the Taukei Movement was a spontaneous outpouring of Fijian
protest against what was seen as an Indo-Fijian-dominated government.
The events leading up to and following the coups of 1987 have generated
an extensive literature that includes sources for background information
on the Taukei Movement (see, eg, B Lal 1988; Robertson and Tamanisau
1988; Scarr 1988; V Lal 1990; Dean and Ritova 1988; Howard 1991).
From its inception, Taukei rhetoric called attention to a tension between
the Christian values that ought to govern human relationships and the
fierceness and violence that characterized Fijian society in the pre-Chris-
tian era. These were sometimes juxtaposed as the “law of the Book” and
the “law of the club” (see, eg, Fiji Times, 30 April 1987). Some Taukei
supporters argued that the election of the Coalition government had
pushed Fijians to the brink, and the time had come to take up the club
once again.
On one occasion this threat became reality in a symbolically charged
way. On 4 September 1987, two weeks before the second coup, a small
coup of Taukei supporters gathered on the grounds of the Government
Buildings. Their faces were blackened, a traditional preparation for war.
Beside the statue of Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, high chief and principal archi-
tect of the Fijian Administration (the “government within a government”
that administers Fijian affairs), they dug an earth oven (lovo). Bearing
clubs and spears they performed a war meke (dance-chant). Their spokes-
man made sure there would be no misunderstanding of their message.
The action was taken to protest the legal complaint brought by the de-
posed prime minister, Dr Bavadra, against the governor-general for the
dissolution of parliament. Bavadra’s suit was interpreted as an insult to
the governor-general’s high rank as a paramount chief. If the matter were
not dropped, the Taukei spokesman said, the lovo would be the ultimate
result, a reference to cannibal feasting on the bodies of slain enemies.6
The threatened outcome of this tableau was the dissolution of the con-
trols imposed by Christianity and colonialism. However, little over a year
later the “law of the Book” defined the principal issue of ethnonational-
istic protest. Following the second coup a Sunday Observance Decree had
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of public recreation (eg, organized sports) on Sundays. Late in 1988 the
ban on public transport was to be lifted, raising fears among some Fijian
Methodists that the entire set of prohibitions would eventually be sus-
pended. They protested the relaxation through a series of roadblocks,
using their bodies, at least figuratively, to disrupt the flow of traffic. The
interim government took a firm stand, and large numbers of protesters
were arrested.
The Sunday protest movement precipitated a serious split in the leader-
ship of the Methodist Church. On one level the issues were religious in
nature: whether observance of the Sabbath should be voluntary or com-
pulsory—a matter of faith and conscience or a rule of law. Certainly the
division in the church hierarchy was complicated by issues of personality
and personal loyalty. But as with many other conflicts in Fiji, it is impos-
sible to divorce the specific issue in dispute from the larger context of
ethnic politics. While all ethnic groups were affected by the Sunday ban,
the public transport companies were mainly Indo-Fijian owned, and most
Indo-Fijians are not Christian. Perhaps not surprisingly, the language of
those who protested the lifting of the transport ban carried a powerful
subtext in which religion was linked with ethnicity and nationalism. In a
meeting with Major General Rabuka, leader of the coups and, at the time,
minister for home affairs in the interim government, dissident church
ministers stated that the nation would not find peace, happiness, and sta-
bility from money and development. The welfare of the nation could only
be assured by following the path of Christianity and observing the Sab-
bath. They warned that if the roadblocks did not deter the government
from lifting the ban on public transport, more drastic action would be
taken. Rabuka was reminded of his Christian duty; the Methodist
Church’s general secretary, Reverend Manasa Lasaro, was quoted as say-
ing to him,
You should be willing to die to carry out the cause but we want you to know
that we will support you even if we will have to be shot down. So much has
been taken away from us [Fijians] and we are now left only with our faith,
which we will fight to the death to keep. (Fiji Times, 20 December 1988)
For those who protested the lifting of the Sunday ban, the well-being of
the body politic depended on subjecting the bodies of individuals to the
ritual restrictions of Christian fundamentalism. Though dispossessed,
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mortal bodies for the good of their souls and the welfare of the nation.
Manichean dichotomies of darkness versus light, goodness versus evil,
and Christian versus heathen are very much a part of Fijian discourse
about their history and traditions. But even though ethnonationalistic
rhetoric called attention to the contradictions between the warlike prac-
tices of the past and the teachings of Christianity, both were claimed as
intrinsically Fijian. Together they constituted a reservoir of symbols that
could be drawn on in the discourse of protest and ethnic differentiation.
(Those who supported the Coalition government and the lifting of the
Sunday ban countered with the language of constitutionality and a more
tolerant reading of Christianity.)
Despite this rhetorical use of the contradictions and discontinuities of
their history, Jolly’s claim that Fijians also emphasize the continuity of
their way of life is justified (1992b; see also Toren 1988). She is correct to
point out that this perception of continuity was made possible by the
retention of land rights and the validation of (some aspects of) Fijian
custom by colonial authorities. Equally important to this perception,
however, is the continuity that has existed in the relationship between
hierarchy and religion in Fijian society. There have been continuities as
well in the ways in which that relationship is manifested in bodily practice.
Sahlins has pointed out that in Fiji conversion to Christianity was a
political act and a top-down process (1985; see also Thornley 1979).
Chiefly converts brought their followers with them into the Christian
fold. A district that resisted conversion was also resisting the hegemony of
centralized government, and conversely, conversion was tantamount to
political submission.7 The pivotal role of chiefs in the conversion process,
and subsequently in the politico-religious structures of church and state,
had its counterpart in indigenous religion. Chiefs had been simultaneous-
ly officiants and the embodiments of gods in cults of prosperity (Hocart
1952).
In Christian Fiji, if no longer gods, chiefs are still conduits to the power
of ancestors and ancestral deities who remain important though (in the
orthodox Christian view) subservient to the Christian God, Na Kalou.8
The Christian God and the ancestors are invoked in different contexts
and through different means. Na Kalou is worshipped through prayer
and the Christian liturgy, while the ancestors and ancestral deities are ap-
proached in the contexts of kava ritual and ceremonial exchange.
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seniority, and gender, but the ways in which these principles interact to
produce inequality varies with context and with region. Throughout Fiji,
however, chiefs, elders, and men play dominant roles in both Christian
worship and cakacaka vakavanua (literally “work in the manner of the
land or place,” that is, traditional ritual). In both types of rituals, key
status differences are expressed and reinforced. One important medium
through which this is accomplished is the spatial distribution of the par-
ticipants. In all social gatherings, whether domestic or public, formal or
recreational, secular or sacred, the seating arrangement expresses hier-
archy in terms of a high-low distinction along a horizontal plane. That is,
houses, churches, meeting halls, and kava circles all have an “upper” and
“lower” end, and sitting higher or lower expresses inequality among
chiefs and commoners, elders and younger people, and men and women
(see Toren 1990; Turner 1988, 1992).
It is significant that the high-low distinction that structures the distri-
bution of the participants in ritual is duplicated in the practices of every-
day life (eg, meals). Ritual typically differentiates social categories through
action and, at the same time, refutes the arbitrariness of those categories
by linking them to the sacred. In the context of Fijian ritual, the spatial
expression of hierarchy is sacralized, and in turn, everyday activities reso-
nate with the sacred truths affirmed by ritual. The power of those who
occupy superior positions in hierarchic relations (eg, men vis-à-vis
women) is sustained in the process.
Fijian children learn the high-low distinction, and the status differences
it expresses, as an integral part of the process of achieving mastery of
their own bodies in everyday social settings (Toren 1990). Categories of
thought (ie, key social and spatial categories) and bodily experience
develop together, and meaning and practice are inseparably intertwined
(cf, Combs-Schilling 1989). An expected consequence of this ontogenetic
intertwining of categorical distinctions and embodied memory is the ten-
dency to be deeply affected by violations of the code of respect. Such
lapses conflict with a basic feature in the construction of Fijian person-
hood. This does not mean that Fijians never behave disrespectfully
toward one another, but when they do, it is treated as a serious matter.
This kind of linkage between patterns of practice and social categories
is not limited to Fiji, and one implication of this is that for any existing
system of social categories to be radically transformed, established pat-
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this reason, revolutionary regimes attempt to restructure the routines of
everyday life (see, eg, Connerton 1989).
In terms of the present discussion it is highly significant that Fijian vil-
lagers interpret their collective past in terms of the same dichotomous
categories (eg, elder versus younger person and high versus low) that
structure their interaction in the present. They also recognize an intimate
relationship between their present lives and the past of their ancestors.
They look to the past to understand events in the present (eg, a serious ill-
ness or sudden death may be explained as the moral consequence of
ancestral actions). But in doing so they simultaneously apprehend the past
in terms of the present (eg, they interpret the past in terms of what they
know about the structural tensions wired into their existing social sys-
tem). A socially constructed past and present thus confront one another
like a set of parallel mirrors. Interpretations of the past reflect the needs,
power relations, and understandings of the present, while the present is
seen to unfold as a consequence of the past (see, eg, Turner 1986).
Although the specific contents of the relationships between elders and
younger kin, chiefs and commoners, and men and women have changed
over time and continue to change, the importance of these distinctions
has not diminished. The embodied language of respect through which
these hierarchic relations are expressed and reproduced serves as an im-
portant thread connecting past and present. Hierarchy is encoded in pos-
ture, movement, and the positioning of the body in social space, and
though there have probably been changes in this incorporated language of
respect, there are also features that are undoubtedly quite ancient (eg, the
importance of the high-low distinction as a marker of gender, age, and
rank inequalities).
Fijian claims of continuity of tradition, despite the acknowledged dis-
continuity of history, have to be understood in terms of these enduring,
embodied, cognitive structures that inform practice. To be sure Christian-
ity and colonialism wrought many changes, including the elimination of
warfare. Prior to pacification, Fijian men kept their weapons near them at
all times (Williams 1982). These habits of preparedness, as well as ideas
about acceptable forms of aggression, gender roles, the content of ex-
change relationships between the living and their ancestors and ancestral
gods (ie, human sacrifice and cannibalistic communion), and the configu-
ration of the social landscape (ie, the composition and placement of vil-
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sibilities for travel and newly created institutions (eg, schools, the Great
Council of Chiefs) facilitated the diffusion of cultural forms throughout
the islands and played important roles in the formation of a pan-Fijian
identity. But if colonial rule eliminated or transformed some practices, it
actively promoted others. There was general support for practices that
promoted effective (though circumscribed) chiefly rule. Those ritual and
ceremonial forms that reinforced hierarchic principles were valorized, and
consequently an important source of bodily memory was retained.
Many Fijians choose to emphasize these continuities of practice rather
than the (acknowledged) transformations and disjunctions. But this
emphasis on continuity must be understood in relation to colonial and
postcolonial history. Assertions of continuity of tradition resonate with
Fijians’ image of themselves as an indigenous people; that is, they claim
continuity of both custom and place. The status of being an indigenous
people is one that Fijians are aware of sharing with other peoples in the
Pacific Islands region and beyond. In claiming that status in the context of
the United Nations–sponsored Year of Indigenous Peoples, some Fijians
sought to identify themselves with the political aspirations of submerged
peoples.
Such claims reflect a perceived need to project and protect a collective
identity that differentiates Fijians from all other peoples in the island
group, but primarily from Indo-Fijians. In this context, the current con-
troversy surrounding the term Fijian needs to be understood. A proposal
to extend the term to include all citizens of Fiji regardless of their ethnic-
ity was one of the reasons offered for a threatened vote of no confidence
in the Rabuka government. To those who opposed the change, using the
term Fijian for all citizens would weaken the claim to a distinctive identity
on the part of Fiji’s indigenous people and would suggest that all citizens
are equally linked to Fiji as land or place.
The Sunday Observance Decree, which emerged as a divisive issue in
1987–88, continues to be explosive in the mid-1990s. The religious basis
of Fijian protest is sincere, but it, too, must be understood in the context
of ethnic politics. Fijians recognize that many of the practices of their
ancestors were incompatible with Christianity (eg, cannibalism). But they
point out that the ethic of caring and sharing (loloma) among kin, and
mutual respect, important elements of Christian teaching, were also part
of the ways of the ancestors. In the image that many Fijians have of them-
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tiated from Indo-Fijians, most of whom are not Christian and are often
depicted as self-seeking individualists pursuing “the path of money” rather
than the ways of mutual love and respect. (See Toren 1984 for a discussion
of the contrast drawn between the path of money and Fijian tradition.)
Understanding how contemporary Fijians think of themselves and others
requires an awareness that culture contact produces “in a particularly
powerful manner, essentialized constructs of selves and others” and that
within these constructed identities particular customs come to be regarded
as emblematic (Thomas 1992a, 82). In many cases the customs, practices,
and institutions that Fijians claim as traditional differ in significant ways
from those of their ancestors. One important kind of difference is trace-
able to the substantivization of practices that resulted from interaction
with other peoples in the colonial context. That is, in the context of inter-
action with Europeans and Indians (and, earlier, with Tongans), Fijians
and these other peoples objectified certain practices and made them
emblematic of a distinctive Fijian identity. Whether or not the practices
themselves were (trans)formed as a result of a contact, their significance
was altered in an important way. “The way things are done” became “the
way we do things”; that is, elements of culture as lived became objectified
as tradition.
Rather than viewing tradition as a passively accepted legacy of the
past, it is useful to think of it as continually reemerging in transmuted
form from the crucible of history. That is, practices and institutions are
continually reevaluated and reinterpreted in relation to changing circum-
stances that include other peoples. Fijian tradition is fluid, but I have
argued that the fluidity is generated by the interaction between an under-
lying continuity and a particular history. The continuity is a product of
the enduring, embodied categories of thought or action that structure
relations between self and other. These constitute a distinctively Fijian
way of “being in the world.” The particularities of history have chan-
neled the process of self-definition, in part by producing world, regional,
and local systems of power. These impose limits on what is possible, as
well as set the parameters for strategic calculations in the politics of iden-
tity. Within the realm of the possible, however, there is ample room for
in-group disagreement and alternative visions of the collective past and
future. Nowadays these alternative visions of Fijians’ past and future are
being promulgated through political parties, letters in newspapers, and
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tion and identity are more process than finished product. Understanding
them, however, requires a consideration of not only the creative, disputed
discourse of self-definition, but also the factors of continuity and con-
straint that set its limits.
Conclusion
In that evanescent juncture between past and future within which human
beings live out their lives, all peoples confront questions about the nature,
meaning, and value of their collective pasts. Like any other attempt to
understand and represent, this is a creative, interpretive process. After all,
the past can only be known indirectly through its traces—inscriptions,
material remains, and memories. These traces never fully re-present the
past, nor are they transparent.
Representations of collective pasts inevitably reflect the concerns and
understandings of the present in which they are formed. Since even in the
simplest of societies persons experience the present from the differing per-
spectives of their respective statuses, representations of the past reflect
differing points of view. These differing viewpoints are asserted, contested,
and resisted in public discourse and in private lives.
Much of the recent literature on tradition has focused on these creative
and discursive processes. I have argued that key contributions to this
literature have been flawed by an overemphasis on the malleability of
tradition and on the novelty and disjunction inherent in invention. This
emphasis results in a very synchronic view of tradition. The focus is on
particular historical moments in which invented traditions emerge as
reflections of particular agendas. Insufficient attention has been given to
the personal and collective pasts that constrain invention and interpreta-
tion and make them intelligible as historical processes. Not only does this
emphasis on malleability misrepresent the interpretive process, it also
undercuts a people’s sense of their tradition as collective memory. Mem-
ory, whether personal or collective, not only validates people’s existence
through time, it also sustains their identity in the present. By deemphasiz-
ing or even denying continuity, the invention-of-tradition literature can be
interpreted (and has been) as threatening others’ powers of self-definition.
* * *
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Notes
1 This is perhaps more true for some peoples than for others, but even settler
nations (eg, the United States and Australia) define themselves at least partly in
terms of their collective pasts.
2 While such a statement may be uncontroversial for social scientists, it con-
flicts with the views of those peoples who understand their ways of life as pat-
terned on archetypic forms mandated by deities or the ancestors. In writing
about these views of the past as a model for the present, anthropologists need to
pay special attention to the issue of continuity, the aspect of tradition that their
informants themselves emphasize. This point is addressed at greater length later.
3 Ritual forms such as rites of passage, which otherwise satisfy the criteria of
“genuine traditions” often use a combination of symbolism, ritual action, and
explicit verbal instruction to deliberately inculcate values, identity (personal and
collective), and respect for tradition (see, eg, Godelier 1986; Herdt 1981; Poole
1982). In that respect such rituals are problematic for Hobsbawm’s formulation.
Ultimately, it is not the presence or absence of deliberate inculcation of values
that is crucial to Hobsbawm’s distinction, but whether or not the historian is able
to document the process of invention.
4 Jonathan Friedman’s (1992a) discussion of such key values in Hawaiian tra-
dition as aloha (caring, sharing, reciprocity) and aloha ‘âina (caring for the land)
makes an interesting comparison with their treatment in Linnekin’s theoretical
discussions of Hawaiian tradition.
5 The word taukei means both “owner” and “native”—statuses that are
defined in relation to vanua (land, place). This choice of names for the movement
was significant, for Fijians, like most other Pacific Island peoples, recognize a
link between social identity (both personal and collective) and land. Many Fijians
would say that land lies at the heart of their sometimes troubled relationship
with Indo-Fijians.
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was going on, Richard Naidu, a spokesman for Dr Bavadra, wandered over to
watch. When they spotted him, the demonstrators chased him across the street
and into the lounge of the Travelodge Hotel. There they attacked him with clubs
and spears in front of the horrified guests.
7 With its emphasis on accommodation to worldly authority, Wesleyan Meth-
odism, the denomination to which most Fijians converted, was ideally suited to
this welding of Christianity and chiefly rule. The relationship between individual
chiefs and particular missionaries was not always mutually supportive, however.
Chiefs on occasion vied with missionaries for control over congregations. Since
churches were almost always built on Fijian-owned land, buildings were ulti-
mately beyond the control of missionaries. Disaffected chiefs could also discour-
age (or fail to encourage) contributions to the mission, but the most powerful
leverage a dissatisfied chief had was the threat of taking his people with him to
another denomination (Thornley 1979).
8 Chiefs represented one conduit of power in pre-Christian religious practice.
Another was the hereditary priest (bete). While the chiefly role was validated
(and transformed) by Christianity, the priests’ role could not be accommodated
in the colonial Church-State. Members of priestly clans played prominent roles in
the politico-religious movements that swept through the interior of Viti Levu in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
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In the postmodern world, tradition and identity are supplanting modernist polit-
ical ideologies in the discourse about conflict. Historians and anthropologists
who write about tradition necessarily enter the political arena within which the
content and meaning of tradition are contested. In the 1980s, social scientists be-
came sensitive to this issue. During that decade the most important contributions
to the study of tradition focused on the issue of invention, the fashioning of rep-
resentations of the past to meet the needs of the present. The invention-of-tradi-
tion literature made a useful contribution by linking tradition to such issues as
the reproduction of social forms, the interaction of culture and history to pro-
duce change, and the role of human agency in both of these processes. Ulti-
mately, however, the emphasis on the malleability of tradition negates what is
ostensively affirmed in this literature—that a people’s traditions are a product of
their historically situated action. Too little attention is paid to the ways in which
interpretations of the past are constrained (and explained) by a determinate past
and to the threads of continuity that link the present to that past. In part, the
continuity that characterizes tradition is a consequence of the fact that traditions
are enacted or embodied. These issues are explored, in part, through a discussion
of the Fiji coups and their aftermath.
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